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Abstract
Since July 2004, the job search effort of long-term unemployed benefit claimants has been
monitored in Belgium. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the
age of 30 present in the first year of the reform to evaluate the effect of a notification sent
at least eight months before job search is verified. Eight months after this notification
and prior to the first monitoring interview, transitions to employment have increased by
nearly nine percentage points compared to the counterfactual of no reform. Participation
in training is raised, but not significantly, while withdrawals from the labor force are not
affected.
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1 Introduction
The payment of unemployment benefits (UB) involves a trade-off between insurance and
work incentives. Many economic researchers have studied how limiting the coverage of
UB and the duration of benefit entitlement can restore work incentives (e.g. see Lalive et
al., 2006). However, most UB schemes also provide work incentives by imposing job search
requirements, amongst others, on benefit claimants. Boone et al. (2007) argue that such re-
quirements, enforced by monitoring and sanctions, may deliver the right incentives by im-
posing lower costs than the aforementioned alternatives. This paper is about the impact of
such a monitoring scheme introduced in the Belgian UB scheme in 2004.
In many countries monitoring of job search effort is organized along relatively standard-
ized procedures (OECD, 2007). It starts off with a notification (often at initial registration)
by which the unemployed worker is informed about the search requirements and the proofs
thereof to be delivered, about the timing of the evaluations of search effort, and about the
associated sanctions in the case of non-compliance. On the prescribed dates, past job search
effort is evaluated on the basis of transmitted paper proofs of job applications or in face-
to-face interviews. If the outcome of the evaluation is negative, a sanction in the form of a
temporary and partial reduction of unemployment benefits (UB) usually follows.
Early studies1 found positive effects of monitoring on the job finding rate. However,
since programs themselves often combined counseling with monitoring, they could not dis-
entangle which of these components was responsible for such findings. A number of later
contributions have succeeded in isolating the pure effects of monitoring. Klepinger et al.
(1997) in the US and McVicar (2008) in Northern Ireland demonstrate that monitoring signif-
icantly increases transitions to employment.2 In contrast to this evidence, Ashenfelter et al.
(2005) find that tighter search requirements in the US have insignificant effects on transitions
to employment and Klepinger et al. (2002) report even slightly decreasing job finding rates.
This is in line with the insignificant effect of job search monitoring reported by van den Berg
and van der Klaauw (2006) for the Netherlands. van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) ar-
gue that the result is caused by the substitution of formal by informal search, a phenomenon
that would be especially relevant for well qualified workers on whom they focus in their
study. Finally, Manning (2009) reports that too strict search requirements may lead UB re-
cipients to stop claiming and to withdraw from the labor force. Petrongolo (2009) confirms
this, demonstrating moreover that monitoring substantially decreases employment stability
1See Meyer (1995) for a review of US studies, Gorter and Kalb (1996) and Dolton and O’Neill (1996, 2002) for
European studies.
2Borland and Tseng (2007) provide evidence of enhanced exits from unemployment, but could not identify
the exit destination.
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and annual earnings in the long term.
In Belgium job search effort has only been monitored since 2004 and it targets only long-
term unemployed workers, collecting UB for more than 13 months. Monitoring consists of
face-to-face interviews in which caseworkers have a reasonable degree of discretion in the
evaluation of the fulfillment of search requirements. The system is more lenient than in many
other countries in that evaluations are much more spread out over time and the first negative
evaluation does not lead to a monetary sanction. In addition, at the time of notification, job
search requirements are not, as is usual, stated in terms of delivering proof of a minimum
number of job applications, but it is rather vaguely stated that one needs to be searching
for jobs on a "regular basis" and to collect written proofs of the search actions undertaken.
By contrast, if imposed, sanctions are substantial. If one does not comply with the search
actions stipulated at the first negative evaluation, benefits can be completely withdrawn
at the subsequent interview: first temporarily during four months, but subsequently the
entitlement to UB is completely halted in the case of recidivism.
In this paper we evaluate the impact of the 2004 reform in Flanders (the Dutch speaking
northern region of Belgium).3 The analysis is based on rich administrative data, which do
not only allow the impact on the job finding rate to be identified, but also on exits to training
and to a residual "out of the labor force" state.4 A regression discontinuity design (RDD),
resulting from the gradual phasing in of the new monitoring scheme by age group, identifies
these effects under weak assumptions (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Between July 2004 and
June 2005 the job search requirements were only imposed on benefit claimants younger than
30 years on July 1, 2004. In the subsequent years, the older age groups were gradually
integrated. This study exploits the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age
of 30. Since this discontinuity disappears after a year, we can only identify the effect of
monitoring job search from the moment that the assessment period starts until eight months
later, before the first monitoring of past job search effort takes place. We therefore cannot
study the impact of the assessments at interviews and the imposed sanctions in the case of a
negative evaluation.
The outline of the article is as follows. In the next section we describe the institutional
setting and the features of the new monitoring scheme. Section 3 describes the data. The es-
timation method is presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the treatment effects on various
outcomes and contains a number of validity checks. A final section contains the conclusion.
3The reform was accompanied by a reinforcement of the counseling intensity in the two other regions (Wal-
lonia and Brussels), so that the reform only identifies the pure effect of monitoring in Flanders. We refer the
interested reader to Cockx and Dejemeppe (2010) for further discussion of the policy reform in Wallonia and
Brussels.
4In Cockx and Dejemeppe (2010) the quality of employment in terms of starting wages and duration was also
studied, but since the causal impact of monitoring on this quality could not be identified, we no longer report
on this aspect.
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2 Institutional Setting and Features of the New Monitoring Scheme
2.1 Before the 2004 Reform
Belgium is a federal state that has decentralized certain policies to regional authorities. The
payment of UB and the issuing of sanctions in the case of non-compliance with the rules are
organized at federal level. The Public Employment Services (PES) are organized at regional
level. They are in charge of counseling, job search assistance, intermediation services and
training of unemployed and employed workers.
In Belgium a worker is entitled to UB in two instances: (i) after graduation from school
conditional on a waiting period of nine months; (ii) after involuntary dismissal from a suffi-
ciently long-lasting job. In contrast to many other countries there is no time limit on the pay-
ment of UB.5 School-leavers are entitled to flat rate benefits while dismissed workers earn
a gross replacement rate ranging between 40% and 60% of past earnings, which is brack-
eted by a floor and a cap. The benefit level depends on household type (head of household,
cohabitant or single) and on unemployment duration for dismissed singles and cohabitants.
Sanctions could be imposed for not complying with administrative rules: (i) making a
false declaration (e.g. with regard to the household type or an undeclared employment re-
lationship) or (ii) being unavailable for the labor market (not registered as a job searcher at
the regional PES, not turning up at an appointment in the PES or UB agency, turning down a
’suitable’ job offer or refusing job search assistance or participation in training offered by the
regional PES, etc.). Before the reform in 2004, roughly 80% of the monitoring reports regard-
ing availability concerned not turning up at an appointment. Job search was not monitored
at that time.6
Job seekers may on their own initiative make use of the services provided by the regional
PES free of charge. In addition, before the 2004 reform the PES in Flanders followed up all
registered job seekers systematically. Inspired by the first European guidelines for employ-
ment,7 job seekers were required to attend a meeting with a counselor a number of months
(9 months for those older than 25) after the initial registration. Depending on the outcome
of this meeting, an action plan was drawn up and followed up. Non-compliance with action
plans could be sanctioned. However, the imposed actions did not consist of job search, but of
participation in counseling and training programs, and of responding to job offer referrals.
5There was an exception for cohabitants living with a partner earning a sufficiently high income (Cockx and
Ries, 2004). However, this scheme was abolished with the 2004 reform.
6Note that at counseling interviews job search strategies could be discussed, but counselors did not monitor
job search effort and if the unemployed person did not follow up the job search advice of the counselor, she
would not be sanctioned.
7This refers to the guidelines decided at the meeting of the European Summit in Luxembourg in 1997 stating
that all unemployed workers should be counseled and appropriately activated not later than six or 12 months
after the start of their unemployment spell, respectively for those younger or older than 25 years.
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2.2 The 2004 Reform
The monitoring scheme was gradually phased in by age group. Between July 2004 and
June 2005 only unemployed workers younger than 30 (on July 1) were involved. In the
following year those younger than 40 were included and between July 2006 and June 2007
those younger than 50. Those older than 50 years are not targeted by the scheme. The
analysis in this paper exploits the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at 30 years in
the first year of the reform.
Figure 1: Timing of the Monitoring Procedure in the Case of Negative Evaluation.
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The monitoring procedure consists of several steps: a notification and up to three face-
to-face interviews. Figure 1 summarizes the timing in the case of negative evaluation. In
the case of positive evaluation at any of the interviews, a new sequence of interviews is
scheduled: 16 months later after the first interview and 12 months later otherwise.
First, the administration selects individuals who have been entitled to UB for 13 months
or more. Roughly one month later (see Section 3.1 for more details) a notification is sent
by mail. It states that the person concerned is required to actively search for a job and to
participate in any action proposed by the regional PES. Some examples of search methods
are provided (copies of letters of application, registration in temporary help agencies, par-
ticipation in selection procedures, etc.) and it is clearly stated that she should collect written
proofs of the search actions undertaken. No quantitative target of the minimum number of
job applications is, however, set. The letter states that the person will be invited to the UB
office to evaluate job search activities retrospectively and that this first interview will take
place at least eight months later. The letter also mentions that the person should contact
the regional PES if she has not been individually counseled before. This is less relevant for
the unemployed in Flanders, since, as mentioned in Section 2.1, in this region all the unem-
ployed aged over 25 are already systematically counseled after nine months.
The monitoring interviews last approximately half an hour. If search effort at the first
and second interview is deemed insufficient an individual action plan is drawn up. This
action plan is evaluated four months later. It states more precise quantitative targets with
respect to the number and type of job search activities to be fulfilled, but there is substantial
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heterogeneity in these plans, since caseworkers may tailor them to individual needs. In
addition, caseworkers have a reasonable degree of discretion in assessing the achievement
of these targets.
In the case of non-compliance benefit sanctions are imposed progressively: (i) No benefit
sanction after a first negative evaluation; (ii) Complete withdrawal of the entitlement to
UB for four months after a second negative evaluation; (iii) Complete withdrawal of UB
until a new entitlement is established after a third negative evaluation. New entitlement to
UB requires proving a spell of full-time employment that lasts at least 12 months without
any interruption. Sanctioned individuals can apply for lower means-tested social assistance
benefits.
Overall, on the one hand this description seems to suggest that monitoring job search
effort is more lenient than in other OECD countries. Job search requirements are imprecise
and no benefit sanction is imposed in the case of non-compliance at the first interview. In
addition, the frequency of monitoring contrasts quite starkly with that in many other coun-
tries: half of the OECD countries require reporting of job search (in most cases) every two
weeks or at least monthly (OECD, 2007). On the other hand, beyond the first interview,
the sanctions in the case of non-compliance seem generally tougher in Belgium than else-
where. For instance, in the Netherlands, a typical punishment for insufficient job search is
a 10% reduction of unemployment benefits for a period of two months (van den Berg and
van der Klaauw, 2006). Moreover, for those still unemployed at the interviews, the probability
of a negative evaluation is high: 44% at the first interview, 48% at the second and 60% at the
third.8 Even if these figures are selective in that they are calculated relative to populations
who exerted relatively little search effort (since they would otherwise no longer be unem-
ployed), they are relevant, since they indicate that the sanction rate is high in the case of
non-compliance and that the threat of a sanction is therefore credible.
3 The Data
We exploit administrative data from several sources: (i) the federal UB agency for monthly
information on UB claims, the monitoring procedure and re-entry into regular education; (ii)
the regional PES for participation in training and job search assistance provided to the un-
employed; (iii) the Crossroads Bank for Social Security which matches the aforementioned
information to records of all federal Social Security institutions. These matched data allowed
us to construct monthly indicators of employment (including self-employment), training
(which includes returns to regular education), and a residual state "out of the labor force",
which is defined as not being employed, neither an UB claimant nor in training. This infor-
mation is available for all sampled individuals from January 2001 until the end of 2006.
8These are average rates among those aged under 30 in the period 2004-8.
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3.1 Sample Selection Criteria
In 2004 the notification in the new monitoring procedure was sent only to individuals who
were younger than 30 years old on the 1 July 2004. Our sample contains individuals living
in Flanders who were at that moment aged 25 years or over, but under 35. For reasons of
confidentiality, the age information was grouped in monthly intervals.
Notifications are sent on a monthly basis. In order to determine the population to whom
they are sent in a particular month (e.g. in July), the administration selects individuals who
have been unemployed 13 months or more according to the last available updated informa-
tion, i.e. at the end of the second month prior to the month of dispatch of the notification
(on May 31 in the example). This delays the moment when the unemployed are notified up
to one month: if the person remains unemployed without any interruption since this last
update, the notification is sent after an effective unemployment duration of more than 14
months. However, since the duration counter9 is reset to zero only if the worker has been 12
months full time employed within the preceding 15 months, unemployment duration may
be shorter (but not less than 13 months) for individuals who have temporarily interrupted
their unemployment spell since selection.
The sample contains all individuals entitled to UB because they were dismissed.10 All
sampled individuals claimed exactly 13 months at the end of each month between May and
August 2004 and satisfied all other requirements to be sent a notification, except the age
requirement for those older than 30. Workers who were entitled for more than 13 months
to UB at sample selection were not retained, because the assignment of this group was not
discontinuous according to age (see Cockx and Dejemeppe 2007 for more details). Those
notified after October 2004 were not considered, since we aim to measure the impact of
notification up to eight months later: In July 2005 the group aged over 30 years starts being
notified.
Since individuals in this sample may have found a job between the selection date and
the receipt of the notification, we can use it to check whether claimants anticipate the no-
tification (see Section 5.1.3). However, in the main analysis we are interested in the effect
of monitoring for those claimants who were unemployed at the moment that they were
notified. We therefore exclude those individuals who between the selection date and the
notification stopped claiming UB. To estimate a placebo treatment effect (see Section 5.1.3),
we also selected a sample according to exactly the same criteria one year earlier, in 2003.
In principle all sampled individuals aged under 30 should receive the notification. How-
ever, as a consequence of the discrepancy between the moment at which the sample was
selected by the UB agency (April 2006) and the actual dispatch of the notification (starting in
9The duration in months is obtained by dividing the number of claimed UB days by 26, i.e. the average
monthly number of payment days, and rounding down to the nearest integer.
10School-leavers were dropped from the analysis, since they are a special uncommon group at the age of 30:
Only 13 school-leavers are older than 30.
6
July 2004), 15% of the sampled workers below 30 were actually not notified in the month in
which they should have been according to regulations. In most cases the letter is dispatched
a few months later. This is essentially a consequence of ex post rectifications in the adminis-
trative data (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2007). As a consequence, the RDD is “fuzzy”. In section
4 we briefly discuss the methodological implications.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample retained for the main analysis. The first
column refers to the sample of unemployed workers between 25 and 29 years old (the
“treated”) and the second to those aged between 30 and 34 (the “controls”). The data provide
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group
25-29 years 30-34 years
Number of individuals 1,088 1,152
Month of (potential) notification
July 27.2% 28.8%
August 25.6% 23.7%
September 24.5% 24.6%
October 22.6% 22.9%
Age
mean age in years on July 1, 2004 27.1 32.1
(standard deviation) (1.4) (1.4)
Sex
women 53.0% 53.1%
Nationality
Belgian 88.8% 86.6%
EU15 (excluding Belgian) 3.1% 5.1%
others 8.1% 8.3%
Schooling level
primary 17.1% 22.6%
lower secondary 22.2% 17.8%
upper secondary 47.4% 41.7%
higher education 13.1% 17.7%
other studies 0.1% 0.3%
Category of insured unemployment(a)
head of household 16.6% 23.4%
single 24.5% 22.7%
cohabitant 58.8% 53.9%
Recent participation in training(a)(b) 17.7% 19.3%
Recent work experience(a)(b) 50.5% 42.6%
mean number of days in employment 76.1 80.3
(standard deviation) (67.6) (70.8)
Mean unemployment rate(c) by district of living (standard deviation) 8.3% 8.2%
(1.8) (1.8)
(a) At the sampling date, i.e. 1 month prior to the (potential) notification.
(b) During the year before the sampling date.
(c) The ratio of the number of benefit claimants available for the labor market and the number of work-
ers insured against unemployment, by district of living on May 31.
information on the following characteristics of the unemployed workers: the starting date of
the observation window corresponding to (potential) dispatch of the notification letter (July,
August, September or October 2004), the age reported in years (but measured in months)
on the 1 July 2004, the gender, the nationality, the level of education, the household-type
7
determining the UB level (head of household, single or cohabitant), an indicator of recent
participation in training (including a return to regular education and job search assistance)
and of recent employment experience, both during the year before sample selection, and
the unemployment rate by district of living. Time-varying variables are evaluated at the
sampling date, i.e. roughly one month prior to the (potential) dispatch of the notification
letter.
The composition of the population varies across age groups. The gradual increase of the
educational level over time may explain why a larger share among those aged over 30 has
only completed primary education. The fact that the higher educated among the long-term
unemployed younger than 30 were not in employment for sufficiently long to be entitled to
UB upon dismissal,11 explains why the fraction with tertiary education is also higher among
the older group. The older group also contains relatively more heads of households and
fewer cohabitants, since a larger fraction has left the parent’s house to form a family. Note
that this variation of the composition across age groups does not compromise the evaluation
as long as it does not display a discontinuity at the age of 30 (see Section 5.1.3). In Section
5.1.3 we jointly test and indeed reject the presence of such discontinuities.
Between 43% and 50% of the long-term unemployed workers have been employed dur-
ing the year prior to the selection date. This apparent contradiction is related to the afore-
mentioned administrative definition of unemployment duration which allows spell inter-
ruptions. Finally, the last line of Table 1 reports the local unemployment rates at district
level. The unemployment rates reported in Table 1 are biased upwards, since employment
in public administrations is excluded from the definition of the labor force, so that the de-
nominator is underestimated. These are, however, the only available unemployment rate
statistics at district level. For comparison, according to the standard ILO definition 5.5% of
the Flemish labor force was unemployed in 2004.
3.3 The Outcome Variables
The outcome variables are measured at the end of each month following the (potential) dis-
patch of notification up to the eighth month.12 Remember that we cannot consider the out-
come beyond this month, as the older group starts receiving notifications and can therefore
no longer serve as a control group. The benchmark outcome is a discrete indicator measur-
ing whether any job has been found since the notification, regardless of whether any other
labour market state, such as training or inactivity, has been occupied in between. More pre-
cisely, the indicator is set to one as soon as, within a month, the person concerned does not
claim any UB as a full-time unemployed worker and is officially registered as a salaried or
self-employed worker.
11Remember that school-leavers were not retained in the analysis.
12Note that the first monitoring interview takes place from the ninth month onwards.
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Three additional outcome variables are analyzed. The first is an indicator of participa-
tion in training. This indicator does not only comprise training in a strict sense, but also job
search assistance and re-enrollment in regular education. The second outcome variable is
an indicator of withdrawal from the labor force, defined as the residual state. Finally, we
will also perform a sensitivity analysis in which we only consider direct exits to employ-
ment without any intervening transition in training or out of the labor force. This aims to
investigate whether training acts as a possible pathway through which monitoring works.
4 The Econometric Model
The empirical analysis aims to identify the effect on the various outcome variables described
in the previous section of a notification announcing that job search effort will be evaluated at
least eight months later. Identification is based on the discontinuity of the treatment during
the first year of the reform occurring at 30 years, as measured on July 1, 2004. RDD analysis is
by now well established in the economics literature (see e.g. Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). The forcing variable Ai is the age of the individual i (i = 1, 2, ...N ),
measured in deviation from the discontinuity point at 30 years on 1 July 2004. IfDi ≡ 1[Ai <
0] denotes the treatment status (notification) of individual i, Xi the vector of explanatory
variables and F (Ai) is a polynomial, possibly different on either side of the discontinuity
point (a "spline"), then the following linear regression equation identifies the treatment effect
βk in the kth month (k = 1, 2, ...8) after (potential) dispatch of the notification:
Yik = αk + βkDi + F (Ai) +Xiγ + Uik (1)
where Yik is the outcome variable of interest for individual i at the end of the kth month and
Uik denotes the error term. We use cluster-robust standard errors at the individual level to
take both heteroskedasticity and the correlation of across time k into account.
In Section 3.1 we mentioned that the RDD is “fuzzy”. Observe that the fuzzy design is
particular in that the treatment is only available at one side of the discontinuity threshold:
No individual older than 30 is assigned to the treatment. Battistin and Rettore (2008) show
that in this case identification assumptions of the sharp design are sufficient to identify the
average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) at the discontinuity point. Since the fraction of
those treated is never lower than 85%, ignoring the fuzzy nature of the RDD only leads to a
minor under estimation of the treatment effect. In the presentation of the empirical results
we report the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator for the preferred specifications of
the four aforementioned outcome variables. We choose in the first step the same degree of
the polynomial spline as in the second step and Di acts as an "instrumental variable". For
simplicity, the sensitivity and validity analysis is based on ordinary least squares (OLS), i.e.
on the "intention-to-treat" effects.
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5 The Empirical Findings
5.1 The Effect of the Notification on the Job Finding Rate
We first present the findings for a benchmark model. Subsequently, we perform a sensitivity
analysis and test the validity of the RDD.
5.1.1 The Benchmark Findings
Figure 2 displays descriptive evidence of the effect of monitoring eight months after dispatch
of the notification. The average transition rate since notification in bins with a bandwidth of
10 months is plotted in a window of five years on either side of the cutoff point of 30 years
(= 360 months). A narrower bandwidth would make graphical evidence too noisy.13
Figure 2: Discontinuity of the Job Finding Rate Eight Months after Notification
Note: The dashed (solid) straight lines depict the linear spline estimated within an age window of 5 years (40
months) on either side of the discontinuity. The vertical double-headed arrows display the coressponding sizes
of the intention-to-treat effects eight months after notification.
As observed in many studies, the job finding rate is observed to decline with age, at least
from about 27 years. At 30 years the job finding rate falls sharply. This is evidence that
the notification sent to the unemployed less than 30 years old speeds up the transition to
13We follow Lee and Lemieux (2010, p. 309) and test this formally by doubling the number of bins (i.e. setting
the bandwidth to five months). We test whether the associated bin indicators are jointly significantly different
from the initially chosen ones. The corresponding F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis at a significance level
of 5.2%. If we maintain a bandwidth of five months for the last 10 months of the age window (i.e. between 410
and 419 months), then the p-value of the F-test increases to 44.0%.
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employment. The solid straight lines to the left and to the right of the discontinuity point
at 30 depict the linear spline estimated on data within an age window of 80 months (40
months at either side of the discontinuity at 30 years) as chosen in our benchmark model.
The vertical double-headed arrow between these lines at the discontinuity displays the size
of the intention-to-treat effect eight months after the notification. The dashed straight lines
show the linear spline estimated on the full age window of five years on either side of the
discontinuity. Since these lines cannot capture the increasing relationship between the job
finding rate and age between 25 and 27 years, its slope on the left-hand side of the cutoff
point is underestimated and, hence, overestimates the effect (see the dashed double-headed
arrow at the discontinuity). This is essentially why we restrict the analysis to the narrower
window in the benchmark. We discuss this choice further in Subsection 5.1.2.
Table 2 reports the main results for the benchmark model. The column below αk reports
the predicted job finding rate of 30 year olds in the absence of a notification. One month af-
ter the counterfactual notification 9 percent have already found a job. In the subsequent
4 months the job finding rate increases on average by nearly 5 percentage points (pp) per
month, bringing the cumulative job finding rate to 28.5% after five months. From then un-
til the eighth month after the counterfactual notification, the job finding rate slows down
slightly to 3 pp per month. After eight months 37.5% of the 30 year olds have found a job.
The columns below βk report the treatment effects of notification for those slightly below
the age of 30. The one headed by "OLS" reports the "intention-to-treat" effects. As mentioned
in Section 4, these are only slightly lower than the 2SLS estimates, which weight the OLS
estimates by the fraction of effectively notified, thereby explicitly taking the "fuzzy" nature
of the RDD into account.
The point estimates suggest that the nofication increases the job finding rate considerably.
This increase seems to occur especially in the second and third month after notification. In
the second month the job finding rate increases by 5 pp and in the third by an additional 2
pp. Between the third and sixth month the notification does not seem to have any further
impact. Finally, in the last two months the job finding rate increases by an additional 1.3 pp
to end up with a cumulative increase of 8.8 pp, which corresponds to a proportional effect
of 23%.14 Even if these effects are not precisely estimated, this last effect is significant at a
p-value of 5.9% and for the other effects from the third month onwards the p-values are close
to 10%.
In view of the relatively lenient monitoring system in which interviews are conducted at
a low frequency, the job search requirements are not precisely defined and a benefit sanction
is not imposed in the case of non-compliance at the first interview, these important treatment
effects may come as a surprise. However, this does not mean that we should expect that such
a scheme would not have any noticeable effect on rational individuals who are completely
140.088/0.375=0.023.
11
Table 2: The Effect of Monitoring on the Job Finding Rate
OLS 2SLS(c)
# months since notification (k) αk (a) standard error βk (b) s.e. βk (b) standard error p-value
1 0.092** 0.023 -0.013 0.035 -0.012 0.041 0.766
2 0.148** 0.025 0.043 0.037 0.051 0.043 0.236
3 0.192** 0.026 0.062 0.039 0.071 0.045 0.115
4 0.245** 0.027 0.062 0.040 0.072 0.045 0.115
5 0.285** 0.027 0.063 0.040 0.072 0.046 0.116
6 0.313** 0.028 0.066 0.040 0.075 0.046 0.102
7 0.339** 0.028 0.073* 0.041 0.083* 0.046 0.073
8 0.375** 0.028 0.078* 0.041 0.088* 0.046 0.059
Order of the polynomial 1
Spline yes
Window width 40 months on either side of 30 years (DS ± 4 ∗ 10)
Control variables yes
# individuals = N 1,490
(a) The job finding rate for 30 year olds without notification.
(b) The effect of the notification on the job finding rate of 30 year olds.
(c) 2SLS weighs the OLS ("intention-to-treat") estimate of the treatment effect with the fraction below 30 years that is effec-
tively notified. It explicitly takes the "fuzzy" nature of the RDD into account.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level.
informed about the functioning of the monitoring scheme. Cockx et al. (2011) estimate on
the same data15 a non-stationary structural job search model that takes the main features
of the Belgian monitoring scheme into account and find that eight months after notification
the job finding rate is about 2 pp higher than without monitoring. This lies within the 90%
confidence interval of the RDD point estimate.
Cockx et al. (2011) show that the incentive to increase search effort depends on the dif-
ference between the expected welfare in the case of a positive and negative outcome and
the extent to which the probability of a positive evaluation can be influenced by enhanced
job search effort. Despite the imprecision of job search requirements, Cockx et al. (2011)
find clear evidence that this probability significantly increases with job search effort. In Sec-
tion 2.2 we have mentioned that, compared to other countries, the sanctions in the case of
non-compliance are relatively important. However, since the unemployed discount the fu-
ture and since sanctions are not yet imposed at the first interview, it is probably rather the
relatively high reward in the case of a positive evaluation that drives most of the effect of
monitoring on the job finding rate before the first interview. A positive evaluation at the first
interview delays the subsequent monitoring interview by as much as 16 months, while in
other countries the frequency of interviews often remains fortnightly or monthly. Cockx et
al. (2011) label this front-loading of job search effort, because the enhanced job search effort
induced by the reward needs to be traded-off against the reduced effort after the interview.
The fact that the reported RDD estimates of the treatment effect are much higher than
those estimated within a structural search model can be a consequence of their imprecision.
15Cohabitants who do not earn a flat rate benefit are excluded in their analysis.
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Another explanation could be that an important fraction of the notified long-term unem-
ployed was not sufficiently literate (the notification was not transmitted in a face-to-face
interview, but in a letter) to fully understand that non-compliance is sanctioned only after
two negative evaluations and not earlier than one year after receipt of the notification. This
interpretation is supported by the fierce criticism in the media in 2004 by trade-unions and
other pressure groups that the new scheme would "hunt down" the unemployed. This could
indeed have enhanced the perception that monitoring was very strict and the threat of a
sanction very high, which may therefore have triggered an overreaction of some individuals
who were not well informed about the monitoring procedure. This is also consistent with
the time profile of the effect which suggests that the bulk of the effect is realized within the
first three months after receipt of the notification.
Finally, note that monitoring in Belgium is targeted on long-term unemployed. For this
group monitoring may be more effective than for short-term unemployed, since informal
job search channels may have "dried up",16 so that there may be less scope for substitution
between formal and informal search.
5.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In Table 3 we display how the treatment effect varies with the polynomial (spline) speci-
fication up to a second degree for sub-samples selected within an increasingly narrow age
window around the cutoff point. All regressions include the explanatory variables men-
tioned in Table 1. In line with the bandwidth choice of the graphical analysis, we consider 6
discontinuity samples: DS±1∗10-DS±6∗10. The discontinuity sampleDS±1∗10 consists
of the treated within the age bracket [350, 360) months and the control group in the bracket
[360, 369) (360 months = 30 years). The other discontinuity samples are defined accordingly.
Table 3: The Intention-to-Treat Effect on the Job Finding Rate Eight Months after Notifi-
cation (β8) for Various Windows and Polynomials
Window width DS ± 6 ∗ 10 DS ± 5 ∗ 10 DS ± 4 ∗ 10 DS ± 3 ∗ 10 DS ± 2 ∗ 10 DS ± 1 ∗ 10
Polynom. order
Zero 0.122**(0.020) 0.120**(0.022) 0.103**(0.025) 0.083**(0.028) 0.095**(0.035) 0.109**(0.050)
One 0.097**(0.033) 0.090**(0.036) 0.077* (0.041) 0.090* (0.047) 0.118**(0.059) 0.155**(0.086)
One spline 0.098**(0.033) 0.091**(0.036) 0.078* (0.041) 0.089* (0.048) 0.120**(0.059) 0.156* (0.087)
Two 0.097**(0.033) 0.091**(0.036) 0.077* (0.041) 0.090* (0.047) 0.117**(0.059) 0.155* (0.086)
Two spline 0.104**(0.048) 0.107**(0.053) 0.125**(0.059) 0.173**(0.069) 0.177**(0.087) 0.296**(0.136)
# indiv. = N 2,240 1,895 1,490 1.119 737 378
Standard errors in parentheses. In bold the benchmark estimate.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level.
Observe that for the benchmark window (DS ± 4 ∗ 10) with a linear, quadratic or linear
16See van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006, p. 928), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Ioannides
and Datcher Loury (2004, p. 1069-1071) for discussion on the "drying up" of informal job search channels over
the course of the unemployment spell.
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spline specification of the polynomial the treatment effects are the most conservative ones of
those reported in Table 3. This can be explained as follows. First, since from the graphical
analysis we could deduce that the job finding rate decreases with age both to the left and
to the right of the discontinuity, we expect that the specifications without a polynomial in
age over estimate the treatment effect. We indeed find that for the three widest windows
(DS±4∗10-DS±6∗10) the estimated effects with the linear (spline) and quadratic polynomial
are smaller than those without it. For the narrower windows (DS ± 1 ∗ 10-DS ± 3 ∗ 10) this
relation reverses, however. This is induced by the positive relationship between the outcome
and age between 29 and 30, and between 31 and 32 years (see Figure 2), which is captured by
the polynomial if the data are restricted to these narrower windows, and reinforces therefore
the estimated treatment effects as compared to those in the wider windows. Since in the
literature it is generally found that the relationship between the job finding rate and age is
negative, we believe that the observed positive relationship in the data is idiosyncratic and
likely to bias the treatment effect upwards. Moreover, as already discussed in the previous
subsection, following the same reasoning and illustrated by the dashed lines in Figure 2, the
positive relation between the job finding rate and age between 25 and 27 years biases the
effect in the same direction.
To conclude, from these arguments, since we believe that the true relationship between
the job finding rate and age must be negative, the treatment effects estimated on the basis of
a linear spline on the window that excludes the two widest age intervals (DS ± 4 ∗ 10) yield
the most credible estimates of the treatment effect.
5.1.3 Validity Tests
In this subsection, we test for the validity of the RDD. We (i) consider a falsification test for
alternative discontinuity points; (ii) check for the presence of a placebo treatment effect in
the year prior to the reform; and (iii) test for precise manipulation of the RDD.
We implement the falsification test as proposed by Lee and Lemieux (2010, p. 326-27) by
examining whether there are unexpected discontinuities in the regression function in other
months. For this purpose, we add to the benchmark model (DS ± 4 ∗ 10) with a linear
spline indicator variables for each 10 months17 and we interact each of these variables with
the time since notification (k = 1, 2, ...8). As such 6 × 8 = 48 additional parameters were
estimated. The falsification test consists of testing whether these additional parameters are
jointly different from zero. Note, since we specified a common polynomial in age for all k,
the test does not only reject if there are unexpected discontinuities, but also if the polynomial
is specific for certain k. However, we cannot reject the null (p-value = 0.418). Since we expect
the treatment effect to increase with k, we also tested whether only the interactions with the
17Note that the first indicator variable to the left and the right cannot be separately identified from the linear
spline. We add therefore 3× 2 = 6 indicator variables for the DS ± 4 ∗ 10 sample.
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indicators at k = 8 were jointly significant. Again the null cannot be rejected (p-value =
0.506).
Second, we estimated the effect of a placebo treatment on a sample of unemployed work-
ers aged between 25 and 34 years old to whom a notification would have been sent if the
monitoring scheme had been in place in 2003. The estimated intention-to-treat effect for the
benchmark model (DS ± 4 ∗ 10 ) is -0.2 percentage points with a standard error of 3.8 pp.
Moreover, no treatment effect is significantly different from zero in a sensitivity analysis (not
reported) similar to the one displayed in Table 2.
The RDD approach is only valid to the extent that individuals cannot alter their behavior
- "manipulate the forcing variable" - to avoid (or to benefit from) the treatment, i.e. “to
precisely “sort” around the discontinuity threshold” (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010). In
this study the forcing variable, age, cannot be manipulated directly, but indirectly, since
assignment to the treatment is not solely based on age, but also on being a benefit claimant
for 13 months or more. This unemployment duration can be manipulated if the unemployed
workers anticipate the dispatch of the notification and leave unemployment even before the
notification. Note, however, as stressed by Lee (2008), that this manipulation invalidates the
RDD only to the extent that workers have a precise control over exit from unemployment.
For instance, if anticipation implies increased job search, this need not invalidate the RDD,
since the outcome of the job search process is random, so that the worker cannot avoid the
notification with certainty. It would be more problematic if the worker, in anticipation of the
notification, decided to decline her entitlement to UB. However, it is unlikely that a written
notification raises the perceived marginal cost to that extent. Notice, in addition, in the case
of temporary interruptions in the payment of UB, which applies to a substantial fraction of
the sampled individuals (see the fraction with recent work experience in Table 1), it may
be difficult to anticipate the exact moment at which the notification arrives, because the
calculation of this moment is rather complex (see Section 3.1). Nevertheless, we test for the
presence of this kind of precise manipulation.
We implement three tests. First, since the sample is selected at the end of the second
month prior to notification (cf. Section 3.1), we can verify by RDD whether workers slightly
below the age of 30 years are more likely to find a job one month before notification than
workers slightly older than 30. In Figure 3 we present the graphical analysis of this effect.
The evolution of the job finding rate over the age window is quite erratic. The dashed lines
represent a linear spline specification for theDS±4∗10 sample. Since within this age window
the job finding rate sharply increases with age both at the left- and the right-hand side of the
discontinuity, the treatment effect for this benchmark is higher than for other bandwidths
and polynomial specifications. The point estimate is equal to 2.1 pp with a standard error
equal to 1.3 pp. This is, however, the only specification for which the effect is significant at
the 10% level. For instance, if we estimate the effect with a linear spline on the widest age
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window (DS ± 6 ∗ 10), the relationship between the job finding rate and age again becomes
negative as expected (see the solid lines in Figure 3) and the point estimate of the treatment
effect is then equal to 0.7 pp with a standard error equal to 1.1 pp. We therefore conclude
that the notification is not anticipated.
Figure 3: Discontinuity of the Job Finding Rate One Month before Notification
Note: The dashed (solid) straight lines depict the linear spline estimated within an age window of 5 years (40
months) on either side of the discontinuity. The vertical double-headed arrows display the coressponding sizes
of the intention-to-treat effects one month before notification.
Second, we test whether the 18 predetermined characteristics (reported in Table 1) are
smooth around the cutoff age. To do so, we follow the suggestion of Lee and Lemieux (2010)
to estimate for the widest window size all 18 regression equations with a common linear
spline jointly in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) and test for the joint significance
of discontinuities at the cutoff point for the DS ± 4 ∗ 10 sample. Even if one variable (lower
secondary school) is individually significant at the 5% level, the absence of discontinuities
cannot jointly be rejected at a p-value of 16% (F(17,1489)=1.34). Finally, we test whether the
density of the forcing variable is continuous around the threshold (McCrary, 2008). This
density test is displayed graphically in the two panels of Figure 4. From this figure, but also
from the formal tests (not reported), there is no evidence of any discontinuity.
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Figure 4: Graphical Density Test of the Forcing Variable
5.2 Transitions into Training and out of the Labor Force
Figure 5 displays the effects of monitoring on transition into training and out of the labor
force.18 From this Figure we deduce that, in anticipation of the first evaluation of job search
effort, participation in training increases somewhat, while transition out of the labor force
is not at all affected. According to a linear spline specification for the DS ± 4 ∗ 10 sample
(the benchmark) the notification increased participation in training by 6.5 pp (2SLS) with
a p-value equal to 9.7%. For other age windows (not reported) the estimated effects are
lower and never significant at the 10% level. For instance, for the widest age window the
point estimate falls to 3.9 pp (p-value = 22.1%). By contrast, monitoring does not affect the
transition out of the labor force. The treatment effect in the benchmark model is 1.0 pp and
highly non-significant. In a sensitivity analysis (available on request) the effect is always
very small and never significantly different from zero. Finally note that both the placebo
test on the sample selected in 2003 and the test regarding the anticipation of the notification
cannot be rejected for either outcome variables.19
These findings are in line with expectations. First, Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009)
show that the imposition of stricter job search requirements does not enhance search incen-
tives for all workers, since, if behavior is followed-up too closely, workers may find it too
onerous to continue claiming benefits and may withdraw from the labor force instead. Here,
18The data enebled us to distinguish between claimants of sickness insurance benefits and other forms of
inactivity. A separate analysis of these states did not, however, reveal any differential effects (Cockx and Deje-
meppe, 2010).
19These results are available on request.
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Figure 5: Discontinuity of the Transition to Training and out of the Labor Force Eight Months
After Notification
Training Out of the Labor Force
Note: The dashed (solid) straight lines depict the linear spline estimated within an age window of 5 years (40
months) on either side of the discontinuity. The vertical double-headed arrows display the coressponding sizes
of the intention-to-treat effects eight months after notification.
since it is costly to forgo UB, it is unlikely that such withdrawals occur before the moment
at which one risks a benefit sanction, i.e. not before the second monitoring interview. The
insignificant effect on withdrawal from the labor force is consistent with this hypothesis.
Second, the notification letter states that the person concerned should contact the re-
gional PES if she has not yet been individually counseled before and that she must par-
ticipate in any action proposed by the regional PES. However, in Flanders the regional PES
should already have systematically counseled those unemployed for more than nine months
(see Section 2.1). For many workers there might therefore already have been a relatively re-
cent contact with the PES, which may explain why the effect of the notification on training
participation is not so strong as its effect on the job finding rate.
Even if the impact of monitoring on training is not so strong, one may nevertheless ques-
tion whether training is not the main pathway through which monitoring works. If so, the
effect of monitoring should be much lower if indirect transitions to employment after par-
ticipation in training (or inactivity) are excluded. Eight months after notification the direct
transition rate to employment is according the benchmark model 6.1 pp (standard error =
4.6 pp) higher than in the absence of notification. Compare this to the point estimate of 8.8
pp reported in Table 2. This suggests that roughly 30% of the total impact on the job finding
rate could be induced by enhanced participation in training caused by the notification.
6 Conclusion
This paper studied the impact of an important reform in Belgium which introduced for the
first time job search requirements into the UB scheme. More specifically, it evaluated the
effect on various outcome variables (employment, participation in training and labor force
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withdrawal) of a notification announcing that job search effort will be retrospectively moni-
tored at least eight months later.
Eight months after this notification and prior to the first evaluation of job search effort
the likelihood of a transition to employment is nearly 9 pp higher than in the absence of
the reform. This finding is robust, but not precisely estimated. In view of the relatively
lenient monitoring system in which interviews are conducted at a low frequency, the job
search requirements are not clearly defined and a benefit sanction is not imposed in the case
of non-compliance at the first interview, this high treatment effect may come as a surprise.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that one should expect no effect of this notification. Based
on a non-stationary job search model that takes the main features of the Belgian monitoring
scheme into account, Cockx et al. (2011) find that an increase of 2 pp is consistent with the
rational behavior of individuals who are completely informed about the functioning of the
monitoring scheme. They argue that the relatively high reward in the case of a positive eval-
uation drives most of this effect. This is because a positive evaluation at the first interview
delays the subsequent monitoring interview by as much as 16 months. Cockx et al. (2011)
label this front-loading of job search effort, because the enhanced job search effort induced by
the reward must be traded-off against the reduced effort after the interview.
The fact that the RDD point estimates are much higher than those estimated within a
structural search model can be explained by their imprecision, but can also follow from an
incomplete understanding of the monitoring procedure upon receipt of the written notifica-
tion. Since the monitoring is targeted at long-term unemployed, a non-negligible share of the
notified individuals may not be sufficiently literate to fully understand that non-compliance
is sanctioned only after two negative evaluations and not earlier than one year after receipt
of the notification. The fierce criticism in the media in 2004 by trade-unions and other pres-
sure groups that the new scheme would "hunt down" the unemployed may have had a larger
impact on the behavior of this group. This could indeed have enhanced the perception that
monitoring was very strict and the threat of a sanction very high, which may therefore have
triggered an overreaction of these individuals.
The notification also enhanced the transition into training, but not so much as the tran-
sition into employment. According to the benchmark model the participation rate increased
by 6.5 pp, but for other specifications the effect was found to be lower and not significantly
different from zero. This is because many of the unemployed were relatively recently coun-
seled at the regional Public Employment Office, so that if training is more appropriate than
job search, it would have started earlier, before the (potential) notification. Nevertheless, we
found evidence that the enhanced training participation induced by monitoring could have
been a pathway to employment for about one third of the increase in the job finding rate:
If indirect transitions to employment via training (or inactivity) are excluded, the treatment
effect after eight months falls from 8.8 pp to 6.1 pp.
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It is unlikely that the unemployed would, in response to the job search requirements,
withdraw from the labor force before the moment at which they risk a benefit sanction.
Since this moment occurs no earlier than four months after the first evaluation of job search
effort, the finding that impact on the transition to inactivity is close to zero and insignificant
is consistent with this hypothesis.
The finding that monitoring without an immediate risk of a sanction can enhance the job
finding rate substantially without stimulating the withdrawal from the labor force is impor-
tant, since it demonstrates that this outcome can be realized without an immediate income
loss for benefit recipients. However, this positive outcome comes at the expense of social
costs that are realized ex-post and not analyzed in this research. Some benefit claimants will
be sanctioned if they persist in non-complying. Moreover, the front-loading of job search ef-
fort prior to the interview comes at an expense of a decline in job search effort ex-post, in the
case of a positive evaluation. Whether it is socially optimal to design monitoring schemes
with such features depends crucially on the individual and social discount rate and remains
to be studied.
Finally, our explanation for the magnitude of the treatment effect suggests that it is
more the perceived than the effective strictness that determines whether monitoring works.
Reaching a better understanding of how these perceptions are formed is therefore an inter-
esting research avenue.
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